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STATE V. ARMFIELD: NO RIGHT TO COUNSEL
UNDER MONTANA'S IMPLIED CONSENT
STATUTE
Carolyn L. Wheeler
I. INTRODUCTION
In a concerted effort to cope with the escalating problem of
alcohol-induced automobile accidents, by 1979 every state had
adopted an implied consent statute as one means of removing
drunk drivers from the highways.' The implied consent statutes all
basically provide that anyone operating a motor vehicle within the
state is deemed to have consented to a chemical test for intoxica-
tion at the direction of any police officer having reasonable
grounds to believe the driver is intoxicated, and they provide for
license revocation in the event the driver refuses to take the test.'
Implied consent statutes have been unsuccessfully challenged as
violating the right against self-incrimination,' the right against un-
1. ALA. CODE § 32-5-192 (1983); ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.031 (Michie 1984); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 28-691 (West Supp. 1984); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-1045 (Michie Supp. 1983); CAL.
VEH. CODE § 13353 (West Supp. 1985); COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-4-1202 (1984); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 14-227b (1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2740 (Michie Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 322.261 (West Supp. 1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-5-55 (Supp. 1984); HAWAII REV. STAT. §
286-151 (Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE § 18-8002 (Supp. 1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95-1/2, § 11-
501.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 9-11-4-1 (Burns 1984); IOWA CODE ANN. §
321 B.4 (West Supp. 1984); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1001 (1982); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 186.565
(Baldwin 1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:661 (West Supp. 1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29,
§ 1312 (West Supp. 1983); MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 16-205.1 (Michie 1984); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24(f) (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1985); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 9.2325(3)
(Callaghan Supp. 1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.123(2) (West Supp. 1985); MIss. CODE ANN.
§ 63-11-5 (Supp. 1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 577.020 (West Supp. 1985); MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-
8-402 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-669.08 (1984); NEV. REV. STAT. § 484:383 (1979); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 265:84 (Equity Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50.2 (West Supp. 1984);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-107 (Supp. 1984); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194 (McKinney Supp.
1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.2 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-01 (Supp. 1983); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 4511.19.1 (Page Supp. 1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 751 (West Supp. 1984);
OR. REV. STAT. § 487.805 (1983); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 1547 (Purdon Supp. 1984);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-27-2.1 (1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-2950 (Law. Co-op. 1977 & Supp.
1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 32-23-10 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-10-406 (Supp.
1984); TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6701 L-5 (Vernon Supp. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-
44.10 (1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1202 (Supp. 1984); VA. CODE § 18.2-268 (Supp. 1984);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.20.308 (West Supp. 1985); W. VA. CODE § 17C-5A-1 (Supp.
1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 343.305 (West Supp. 1984); WYo. STAT. § 31-6-102 (1984). For a
discussion of the history and adoption of implied consent laws see Note, Driving While
Intoxicated and the Right to Counsel: The Case Against Implied Consent, 58 TEx. L. REV.
935 (1980).
2. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-402 (1983).
3. One of the first such challenges was to New York's statute in Schutt v. MacDuff,
205 Misc. 43, 127 N.Y.S.2d 116 (Sup. Ct. 1954). The Supreme Court resolved this question
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reasonable searches,4 and the right to due process.5 The Supreme
Court has resolved those questions, but it has not yet decided the
issue of the accused driver's right to counsel before deciding
whether to submit to the blood alcohol level test.' Many states
have considered the question and have come to surprisingly diverse
conclusions.'
On December 28, 1984, the Montana Supreme Court decided,
in State v. Armfield,8 that a person arrested in Montana for driv-
ing under the influence (DUI) has no constitutional right to con-
sult with counsel before deciding whether to submit to a test of his
or her blood alcohol content.9 The court reasoned that the United
States Constitution should not be read to provide such a right, and
implied that the Montana Constitution provides no greater protec-
tion than the federal Constitution.' ° Armfield is important for its
resolution of a key question about the rights of persons accused of
DUI, and for its implicit rejection of an opportunity to interpret
Montana's state constitutional or statutory guarantees of a right to
counsel as more protective than the federal guarantee. This com-
ment discusses the Armfield decision, criticizes the court's analysis
of the central constitutional arguments in light of contrary deci-
sions in other jurisdictions, and briefly addresses the court's appar-
ent unwillingness to consider whether the Montana Constitution
provides an "independent and adequate"" state ground for pro-
in South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983) (test results and the refusal to submit are
within the area of unprotected physical evidence); the Montana Supreme Court followed
Neville in State v. Jackson, - Mont. -, 672 P.2d 255 (1983).
4. Following Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (holding that compulsory
chemical blood tests do not violate the fifth amendment because the evidence is nontestimo-
nial, and do not violate the fourth amendment since such a test is a reasonable search), state
courts have held that states are free to compel drivers to submit to blood alcohol level tests.
See, e.g., State v. Mitchell, 245 So. 2d 618, 621 (Fla. 1971); State v. MaCuk, 57 N.J. 1, 268
A.2d 1 (1970).
5. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (holding that license revocation proceeding
must satisfy the notice and hearing aspects of procedural due process).
6. The right to counsel issue reached the Supreme Court in Washington v. Fitzsim-
mons, 449 U.S. 977, vacating 93 Wash. 2d 436, 610 P.2d 893, aff'd on other grounds, 94
Wash. 2d 858, 620 P.2d 999 (1980). The Supreme Court remanded the case for a determina-
tion of whether there were independent and adequate state grounds for the decision, thus
avoiding a decision on the scope of the sixth amendment right to counsel in the DUI arena.
Fitzsimmons, 449 U.S. 977.
7. See infra notes 43-98 and accompanying text.
8. - Mont. , 693 P.2d 1226 (1984).
9. Id. at -, 693 P.2d at 1228.
10. Id.
11. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (articulating the "independent and
adequate" state grounds test). For a discussion of the development of the doctrine and its
relevance to Montana law, see Elison & NettikSimmons, Federalism and State Constitu-
tions: the New Doctrine of Independent and Adequate State Grounds, 45 MONT. L. REV.
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tecting the rights of a driver arrested on a DUI charge.
II. THE Armfield DECISION
A. Facts
Bozeman police officers arrested Timothy Armfield on a
charge of DUI, took him to the Gallatin County Detention Center,
informed him of the Montana consent law12 and of his right to re-
fuse to submit to a blood alcohol test, and told him that he could
not consult with an attorney before deciding whether to submit to
the test.13 Armfield took the test, then moved to suppress the re-
sults in Bozeman City Court.14 The court denied his motion and
Armfield pleaded guilty.15 Armfield appealed to the district court,
which granted his motion to suppress the test results on the
grounds that the officers had obtained the results in violation of
Armfield's limited constitutional right to counsel." The district
court held that the sixth and fourteenth amendments afford a rea-
sonable opportunity to consult counsel prior to submitting to a
breathalizer test and that in this case a reasonable opportunity
meant the twenty to thirty minutes required to warm up the
breathalizer.1 The state and city appealed from that decision.
B. Holding
The Montana Supreme Court held that there is no constitu-
tional guarantee of an opportunity to seek an attorney's advice
before deciding whether to submit to a blood alcohol test "where
consent is deemed given as a matter of law."' The court restated
the propositions of various Supreme Court decisions which define
the contours of the right to counsel under the sixth, fifth, and four-
teenth amendments.
1. No Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
The Armfield court reiterated that the fundamental sixth
177 (1984).
12. MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-402 (1983)
13. - Mont. at -, 693 P.2d at 1227.
14. Id. at - , 693 P.2d at 1227-28.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. (citing Standish v. Department of Revenue, M.V.D., 235 Kan. 900, 904, 683
P.2d 1276, 1281 (1984) (holding, under a consent statute similar to Montana's, that when
state law deems drivers have consented to chemical tests when arrested for DUI, there is no
constitutional right to consult counsel before deciding whether to submit to the test).
19851
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amendment guarantee of the presence of counsel at trial extends to
the presence of counsel at pretrial events considered to be "critical
stage" encounters under the test of United States v. Wade. 9 The
court held that chemical testing of blood alcohol content is not
such a critical stage because "a breathalizer test is not susceptible
of the suggestive manipulation characteristic of the 'critical stage'
event. ' 20 The court reasoned that Wade only requires that a defen-
dant be assured the opportunity for meaningful confrontation of
the government's case at trial, and that Armfield did not need the
advice of counsel to assure such confrontation."
2. No Fifth Amendment Right to Counsel
The Montana Supreme Court observed that in the landmark
decisions of Massiah v. United States, 2 Escobedo v. Illinois,23 and
Miranda v. Arizona,24 the United States Supreme Court linked the
sixth amendment right to counsel to the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.2 5 In Escobedo6  and Miranda27 the
Court held that the presence of counsel was necessary to help pro-
tect defendants from any coercive tactics which officers might em-
ploy during custodial interrogation, and in Massiah28 it extended
the right of counsel to post-indictment, noncustodial interrogation.
The Montana Supreme Court emphasized that this branch of right
to counsel analysis is inapplicable to breath tests because, under
the recent decision by the United States Supreme Court in South
Dakota v. Neville,2 9 the results of a breath test are not a self-in-
criminating communication. Since the Supreme Court had con-
fined the fifth amendment privilege to communicative testimony,
and had already held that the privilege did not extend to evidence
of physical characteristics,3" the Neville decision was predictable.
The Montana Supreme Court had already adopted and applied the
Neville rule in State v. Jackson,3 in which it held that admission
19. 388 U.S. 218 (1967), cited in Armfield, - Mont. at -, 693 P.2d at 1229.
20. __ Mont. at __, 693 P.2d at 1229.
21. Id.
22. 377 U.S. 201 (1964), cited in Armfield, - Mont. at __, 693 P.2d at 1229.
23. 378 U.S. 478 (1964), cited in Armfield, __ Mont. at -, 693 P.2d at 1229.
24. 384 U.S. 436 (1966), cited in Armfield, - Mont. at __, 693 P.2d at 1229.
25. - Mont. at __, 693 P.2d at 1229.
26. 378 U.S. at 490-91.
27. 384 U.S. at 465.
28. 377 U.S. at 206-07.
29. 459 U.S. 553 (1983).
30. See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); Wade, 388 U.S. at 223; Schmerber,
384 U.S. 757; discussed in Armfield, - Mont. at -, 693 P.2d at 1230.
31. - Mont. -, 672 P.2d 255 (1983).
[Vol. 46
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of a defendant's refusal to submit to a breath test did not violate
his privilege against self-incrimination. The court concluded in
Armfield that a defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel ex-
ists only "where the assistance of counsel is required to protect
other rights guaranteed him by law."'3 2 Without the need to protect
a fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, there is no
concomitant sixth amendment right to counsel.
3. No Fourteenth Amendment Right to Counsel
The district court had based its holding in Armfield on the
fourteenth amendment as well as the sixth, thus suggesting that a
denial of the right to consult with counsel was a denial of due pro-
cess. 33 The Montana Supreme Court reasoned that the fourteenth
amendment could support a right to counsel either through its
function of making the sixth amendment right to counsel applica-
ble to the states, or independently through its guarantees of due
process. 34 Since it had already found that the sixth amendment
provides no such right to consult counsel before deciding whether
to take a breathalizer test,35 the court turned to an analysis of the
requirements of due process. Relying upon Rochin v. California,"6
the court observed that due process requires only that "convictions
cannot be brought about by methods that offend 'a sense of jus-
tice.' ,,37 In Rochin, law enforcement officers illegally entered the
defendant's home, struggled with him to extract evidence he had
swallowed, then had his stomach pumped to retrieve the capsules
they sought.3 The Supreme Court found these practices violative
of fundamental standards of decency,39 but the Montana Supreme
Court found nothing analogous in the arrest and treatment of
Armfield, who submitted to a breath test after officers advised him
he had no right to seek advice of counsel. 40 Since the officers' con-
duct complied with statutory provisions," the court held that it
did not violate Armfield's rights to due process, and further that
the implied consent law itself embodies the community's standards
32. __ Mont. at __, 693 P.2d at 1230.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
36. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
37. __ Mont. at __, 693 P.2d at 1230 (citing Rochin, 342 U.S. at 173).
38. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172.
39. Id.
40. - Mont. at -, 693 P.2d at 1230-31.
41. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-405 (1983).
19851
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of decency and fairplay.4 2
III. A CRITIQUE OF Armfield IN LIGHT OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL
DECISIONS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
A. States in Which There Is No Right to Counsel
Courts in many jurisdictions have reached the same conclusion
as the Montana Supreme Court about the scope of the right to
counsel in the DUI context. Many courts based their decisions on
the assertion that a driver's license revocation proceeding is civil
and not criminal, thus the decision whether to take a blood alcohol
level test is not part of a criminal prosecution and does not require
the advice of counsel.43 When the implied consent law permits the
introduction of evidence of the refusal to take the test in subse-
quent criminal prosecutions, the distinction between civil and
criminal proceedings actually makes very little sense. All except
one of the courts which found the civil-criminal dichotomy deter-
minative were construing statutes which do permit introduction of
evidence of refusal in a later criminal proceeding against the per-
son accused of DUI." At least one court has held that when a state
statute was amended to provide for the admissibility of refusal in a
criminal prosecution, it necessarily implied a reasonable right to
consult with counsel, a right which had not existed under the prior
law when such a refusal was inadmissible.45 Other courts have been
critical of the dichotomy between civil and criminal proceedings,
and have held that labeling the proceeding civil does not justify
abridgment of basic rights.4" For example, the Minnesota Supreme
Court held that since the license revocation proceeding is inextri-
42. - Mont. at - , 693 P.2d at 1231 (citing Rochin, 342 U.S. at 173).
43. See, e.g., Department of Pub. Safety v. Maples, 149 Ga. App. 484, 254 S.E.2d 724
(1979); State v. Severino, 56 Hawaii 378, 537 P.2d 1187 (1975); Ruge v. Kovach, __ Ind.
- 467 N.E.2d 673 (1984); Green v. Department of Pub. Safety, 308 So. 2d 863 (La. App.
1975); Lewis v. Nebraska State Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 191 Neb. 704, 217 N.W.2d 177
(1974); Blow v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 83 S.D. 628, 164 N.W.2d 351 (1969); Cava-
ness v. Cox, 598 P.2d 349 (Utah 1979).
44. GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-392(c) (Supp. 1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 9-11-4-3(d) (Burns
1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:661 (West Supp. 1985); NEn. REV. STAT. § 39-669.08 (1984);
State v. Meinta, 189 Neb. 264, 202 N.W.2d 202 (1972) (refusal to submit to a blood test may
be shown in a DUI prosecution); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 32-23-10.1 (1984); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 41-6-44.10(h) (1981). The only state which does not admit evidence of refusal in a
criminal prosecution is Hawaii. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 286-159 (Supp. 1984) (provides that
proof of refusal to take a chemical test shall not be admissible in any criminal proceeding or
civil action except a license revocation proceeding).
45. Forte v. State, 683 S.W.2d 145, 156-58 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
46. See, e.g., Prideaux v. State Dep't of Pub. Safety, 310 Minn. 405, 409, 247 N.W.2d
385, 388 (1976).
[Vol. 46
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cably intertwined with the prosecution for driving under the influ-
ence, and since a license revocation (for six months) might have as
serious an impact as a criminal sanction, 7 the accused has a right
to consult with an attorney, although the court grounded the right
in a statutory provision rather than the constitution.48
More than a dozen states have rejected defendants' claims of a
right to counsel on the grounds that the decision whether to take a
blood alcohol test does not represent a "critical stage" of the pros-
ecution under the Wade test.'9 In these cases the courts' reasoning
typically has been rather cursory and identical in most respects to
that employed by the Montana court in Armfield.50
B. States in Which There Is a Right to Counsel
Courts holding that persons accused of DUI do have a right to
counsel base the right on either statutory or constitutional
grounds. Those which interpret the federal constitution as protect-
ing the accused driver's right to counsel ground their decisions in
either the sixth amendment, viewing the decision whether to take a
chemical test as a "critical stage" in the prosecution, or in the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Montana Su-
preme Court did not indicate whether it considered these decisions
in deciding Armfield, but a review of these courts' reasoning illus-
trates that the court could have come easily and quite justifiably to
the conclusion that a person arrested for DUI is entitled to the
assistance of counsel in deciding whether to take the blood alcohol
test.
1. Statutory Provisions of a Right to Counsel
Typical of the provisions courts have interpreted to guarantee
an opportunity to consult with an attorney prior to taking a blood
test is an Alaska statute which says that "[i]mmediately after an
arrest, a prisoner shall have the right to telephone or otherwise
47. Id. at 410-11, 247 N.W.2d at 388-89.
48. Id. at 414, 247 N.W.2d at 391.
49. See, e.g., Calvert v. State Dep't of Revenue, M.V.D., 184 Colo. 214, 519 P.2d 341
(1974); Standish v. Department of Revenue, M.V.D., 235 Kan. 900, 683 P.2d 1276 (1984);
State v. Jones, 457 A.2d 1116 (Me. 1983); Commonwealth v. Mandeville, 386 Mass. 393, 436
N.E.2d 912 (1982); Holmberg v. 54-A Judicial Dist. Judge, 60 Mich. App. 757, 231 N.W.2d
543 (1975); Ewing v. State, 300 So. 2d 916 (Miss. 1974); State v. Petkus, 110 N.H. 394, 269
A.2d 123, cert. denied, 402 U.S. 932 (1970); State v. Sandoval, 101 N.M. 399, 683 P.2d 516
(Ct. App. 1984); Flynt v. State, 507 P.2d 586 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973); King v. Common-
wealth, 81 Pa. Commw. 177, 472 A.2d 1196 (1984); Dunn v. Petit, 120 R.I. 486, 388 A.2d 809
(1978); Law v. City of Danville, 212 Va. 702, 187 S.E.2d 197 (1972).
50. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
19851 355
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communicate with his. attorney .... "5 The Alaska Supreme Court
has held that this provision of the criminal law of that state ap-
plies to persons accused of DUI, that denial of requests to speak
with an attorney violates the right of access to counsel, and that
the word "[i]mmediately means just that, not after tests are
given."'52
In some states the statutory right to consult with an attorney
is incorporated into the implied consent law itself and there is a
time limit upon its exercise, ranging from thirty minutes in North
Carolina5" to two hours in Iowa.5 The rationale for such time lim-
its is that the right to counsel must be balanced against the practi-
cal concern that chemical tests are of doubtful validity if not per-
formed promptly after the arrest of the person suspected of DUI
55
In Ohio5" the statutory right to counsel is the same as that of any-
one else accused of a crime although it is honored when the ar-
rested driver is permitted telephone access to counsel.
5 7
In one of the leading right to counsel cases, the Minnesota Su-
preme Court held that the statutory right to counsel is fortified by
constitutional principles." Although both due process concerns
and "critical stage" sixth amendment analysis mandated a right to
counsel, the court did not decide the case on those grounds, but
rather interpreted its general statutory provision of a right to
counsel as guaranteeing that right to one accused of DUI since the
statute provided that any "person restrained" has a right "to a pri-
vate interview at the place of custody."59 This general statutory
right has been specifically incorporated into the implied consent
statute in Minnesota."
51. ALASKA STAT. § 12.25.150(b) (Michie 1984).
52. Copelin v. State, 659 P.2d 1206, 1209, 1211 (Alaska 1983). This holding was clari-
fied in a subsequent proceeding a year later by the Alaska Court of Appeals, which held that
the statutory right to counsel does not attach at the time of an investigatory stop or when
field sobriety tests are administered because the right attaches only after arrest. Copelin v.
State, 676 P.2d 608, 609 (Alaska App.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 430 (1984).
53. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.21(a) (1983). See State v. Howren, 312 N.C. 454, 323
S.E.2d 335 (1984); Seders v. Powell, 39 N.C. App. 491, 250 S.E.2d 690, aff'd, 298 N.C. 453,
259 S.E.2d 544 (1979); State v. Hill, 277 N.C. 547, 178 S.E.2d 462 (1971).
54. IOWA CODE ANN. § 321B.3 (West Supp. 1984). See Fuller v. State, 275 N.W.2d 410
(Iowa 1979); State v. Vietor, 261 N.W.2d 828 (Iowa 1978).
55. See, e.g., Howren, 312 N.C. at - , 323 S.E.2d at 337.
56. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2935.20 (Page Supp. 1984).
57. McNulty v. Curry, 42 Ohio St. 2d 341, 347, 328 N.E.2d 798, 803 (1975).
58. Prideaux, 310 Minn. at 414, 247 N.W.2d at 391; see supra notes 46-48 and accom-
panying text. Accord, City of St. Louis Park v. Bunkers, 310 Minn. 431, 247 N.W.2d 404
(1976).
59. 310 Minn. at 415, 247 N.W.2d at 391.
60. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.123(2)(b)(3) (West Supp. 1985).
[Vol. 46
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In at least two states the person accused of DUI has a pro-
tected right to counsel because of a court rule. Missouri courts
have held that since Rule 37.89, adopted by the Missouri Supreme
Court, provides that "every person arrested and held in custody
shall be permitted to consult with counsel," then it makes no dif-
ference "whether the pending charge against him was to be theo-
retically denominated civil, quasi-criminal or criminal in character.
Such distinctions become meaningless under Rule 37.89."l' The
Washington Supreme Court initially based the right to counsel on
constitutional grounds in Washington v. Fitzsimmons.2 When the
United States Supreme Court vacated the decision and remanded
the case for the court to explain whether the decision was based on
federal or state grounds,"' the court held that its court rule J. Cr.
R. 211(c) provided "an independent and adequate state ground"
for the decision.4 The rule requires that anyone taken into cus-
tody be provided telephone access to an attorney at the "earliest
opportunity. " 65
Montana's statutory guarantee of a right to counsel says that
"[e]very defendant brought before the court must be informed by
the court that it is his right to have counsel before proceeding and
must be asked if he desires the aid of counsel."" This statute is
certainly broad enough to include the right to counsel in an im-
plied consent case if the court had chosen to follow the reasoning
of other jurisdictions eager to protect the rights of all persons sub-
ject to serious sanctions regardless of the nature of their offense.
2. Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
Some courts grounding the right to counsel in a state statute
find that right fortified by constitutional concerns,67 but a few have
relied independently on a sixth amendment "critical stage" analy-
sis. For example, the Vermont Supreme Court held that because
the implied consent law protects the right to refuse to take a
chemical test, the request to take the test rises to the level of a
"critical stage" in the proceedings in that the choice whether to
take the test would "affect the evidence . . . available at trial, and
61. Gooch v. Spradling, 523 S.W.2d 861, 865, 866 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
62. 93 Wash. 2d 436, 610 P.2d 893; see supra note 6.
63. 449 U.S. 977.
64. 94 Wash. 2d 858, 859, 620 P.2d 999, 1000.
65. 93 Wash. 2d at 441, 610 P.2d at 896.
66. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-8-101 (1983).
67. See, e.g., Prideaux, 310 Minn. 405, 247 N.W.2d 385; Fitzsimmons, 94 Wash. 2d
858, 620 P.2d 999. In Fitzsimmons the court said the constitutional analysis was persuasive
even though it rested its decision on the court rule. 94 Wash. 2d at 859, 620 P.2d at 1000.
1985]
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the presumptions to be drawn from that evidence.""
A Texas Court of Appeals has similarly held that the time of
requesting that an accused person submit to a blood test is a "crit-
ical stage" of the proceeding for sixth amendment purposes." The
court reasoned that since the accused person was in custody, and
had been told the consequences of refusing to take the test, he was
"on the horns of a dilemma" because refusal meant license suspen-
sion and use of the evidence against him at trial, while consent
could lead to an automatic conviction of DUI.70 The court con-
cluded "[ilt stretches reason to say this is not a critical stage of a
pretrial proceeding. 7 1 The court found the Texas statute's permit-
ting admission of evidence of refusal of the test in subsequent
criminal proceedings to be determinative in its analysis because it
was the admissibility of the refusal which really created the di-
lemma for the accused person. 72
One of the most thorough explications of the sixth amendment
right to counsel in a DUI case was offered by a Kansas appellate
court in State v. Bristor,s subsequently overruled sub silento by
the Kansas Supreme Court in Standish v. Department of Revenue,
M.V.D.7 4 The Montana Supreme Court would have done well to
have considered the thoughtful analysis of the Bristor court rather
than relying exclusively on Standish as its only authority from an-
other jurisdiction in deciding Armfield.75
First the Bristor court reviewed the landmark Supreme Court
decisions establishing a right to counsel in Powell v. Alabama,76
defining the "critical stage" in Coleman v. Alabama,77 and summa-
rizing the scope and breadth of the right in Kirby v. Illinois.7 s The
Supreme Court stated in Kirby that when a defendant is "faced
with the prosecutorial forces of organized society, and immersed in
the intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law," he has
68. State v. Welch, 135 Vt. 316, 321, 376 A.2d 351, 355 (1977). But see State of Ver-
mont v. Welch, 136 Vt. 442, 394 A.2d 1115 (1978) (in which, one year after a clear statement
that the request to submit to the test is a critical stage, the court inexplicably stated that
the former decision "cannot be read as holding that a request to submit to a breath test is a
critical stage in the federal constitutional sense." Id. at 445, 394 A.2d at 1116).
69. Forte v. State, 683 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
70. Id. at 157-58.
71. Id. at 158.
72. Id. at 157. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
73. 9 Kan. App. 2d 404, 682 P.2d 122 (1984).
74. 235 Kan. 900, 683 P.2d 1276 (1984).
75. - Mont. at - , 693 P.2d at 1228.
76. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
77. 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
78. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
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reached the "critical stage." 9 The Bristor court applied this stan-
dard and found that a defendant arrested and charged with DUI
was at a "critical stage" because it found it "impossible to say" he
was not faced with the prosecutorial forces of society.80
Secondly, the Bristor court reasoned that since a person ac-
cused of DUI has certain rights guaranteed by statute, which he
might irretrievably lose without the guidance of counsel, it is criti-
cal that he have counsel.8" Specifically, since the choice to refuse or
submit to the test carries different sanctions, and since the accused
has a right to an independent blood test, the court thought he
could not make an intelligent decision and protect his rights with-
out the advice of counsel.82 As the court stated:
The decision which is made will be crucial to the future direction
of the defense to the charge. It is at that point that rights may be
gained or lost. Once lost, rights cannot be reclaimed or salvaged;
and even those rights gained, such as the right to an independent
BAT [Blood Alcohol Test], can also be lost by the failure to
timely assert them. Thus, if counsel is not available to the ac-
cused at that point, possible defenses may become irretrievable,
even to the ablest of counsel, for no representation at trial, how-
ever stellar, could undo the harm done at that earlier point in
time.83
The Bristor court distinguished the request for a blood test under
the implied consent law from the situation in Schmerber v. Cali-
fornia ,84 in which the accused had no right to refuse the test,
thereby highlighting that the right to counsel arises not from a
privilege against self-incrimination, rendered irrelevant by the
Schmerber decision, but from a situation in which the defendant
has a choice and needs advice to make the better choice.85
3. Due Process and the Right to Counsel
In Armfield, the Montana Supreme Court unnecessarily re-
stricted its analysis of fairness and justice in the DUI case to a
consideration of whether taking a blood alcohol test with the con-
sent of the accused offends a sense of dignity in the way the
Rochin stomach pumping for evidence offended the Supreme
79. Id. at 690.
80. 9 Kan. App. 2d at -, 682 P.2d at 127.
81. Id.
82. Id. at , 682 P.2d at 127.
83. Id. at , 682 P.2d at 128.
84. 384 U.S. 757 (1966); see supra note 4.
85. 9 Kan. App. 2d at -, 682 P.2d at 128.
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Court.8 6 Other courts have adopted broader views of the due pro-
cess guarantees to make the DUI procedures, as the Oregon Su-
preme Court expressed it, "less draconian and more accommoda-
tive of liberty."87
The courts of New York have long held that "[a]s a matter of
fairness, government ought not compel individuals to make bind-
ing decisions concerning their legal rights in the enforced absence
of counsel."8 In People v. Gursey the court held that a telephone
call does not unduly interfere with the investigative procedure and
that the defendant needs advice of counsel because he has several
statutory options which could only be asserted at the station
house." The New York courts provide only a reasonable and lim-
ited right to counsel,90 and while they do not develop their analysis
specifically in terms of the fourteenth amendment due process
guarantees, their "fairness doctrine"" seems relevant to any con-
sideration of the mandates of due process.
The Arizona Supreme Court followed the rule of Gursey and
held that arresting officers cannot prevent access between an ac-
cused and his lawyer if such access would not interfere unduly with
the matter at hand because to prevent such access would offend
constitutional due process.2 The specific concern of the court was
that denial of the defendant's right to consult with his attorney
prevented him from collecting potentially exculpatory evidence (by
means of an independent blood test) which was no longer available
at a later time.93
In Maryland, the state's highest court has forthrightly stated
that to "unreasonably deny a requested right of access to counsel
to a drunk driving suspect offends a sense of justice which impairs
the fundamental fairness of the proceeding."' 4 The court found
that since the Maryland implied consent statute (in common with
all others) deliberately gives a driver a choice between sanctions
86. - Mont. at - , 693 P.2d at 1230-31.
87. Moore v. State, M.V.D., 293 Or. 715, 723, 652 P.2d 794, 799 (1982).
88. People v. Gursey, 22 N.Y.2d 224, 227-28, 292 N.Y.S.2d 416, 418, 239 N.E.2d 351,
352 (1968) (quoting People v. lanniello, 21 N.Y.2d 418, 424, 288 N.Y.S.2d 462, 468, 235
N.E.2d 439, 443 (1968)).
89. 22 N.Y.2d at 228, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 419, 239 N.E.2d at 352-53. Accord People v.
Sweeney, 55 Misc. 2d 793, 286 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1968) (counsel could assist in decision about
consent to the test and about right to have one's own physician).
90. Gursey, 22 N.Y.2d at 228, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 419, 239 N.E.2d at 352-53.
91. See Roby, The Drinking Driver and South Dakota's Implied Consent-The Need
for Counsel, 23 S.D.L. REV. 403, 417 (1978).
92. McNutt v. Superior Court, 133 Ariz. 7, 9, 648 P.2d 122, 124 (1982).
93. Id. at 10, 648 P.2d at 125.
94. Sites v. State, 300 Md. 702, 717, 481 A.2d 192, 200 (1984).
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affecting "vitally important interests" and that since license revo-
cation could be as much of a burden as a criminal sanction, the
driver must have reasonable access to an attorney before deciding
whether to submit to the test.95
The Supreme Court of Oregon has adopted a unique approach
to a DUI suspect's constitutional rights by holding that an arrested
person's "long established and well-known right" to call an attor-
ney is a fundamental liberty embodied in the fourteenth amend-
ment.96 Using the broadest definition of liberty as "a freedom from
all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints, 97
the Oregon court concluded that a defendant's freedom to call a
lawyer could not be foreclosed or deferred because the time re-
quired to make the call would not have reduced the efficacy of the
breathalizer test.98
Any of these conceptual approaches to due process fairness or
personal liberty could have been applied by the Montana Supreme
Court in Armfield had a "less draconian" 99 result been desired. In-
stead, the court relied on a distinction between Armfield's situa-
tion and that in Rochin to say that apparently the only practice it
would perceive as unfair in the DUI context would be abusive or
overly intrusive means of collecting the physical evidence.
C. The Right to Counsel in Federal Courts
The variation in state courts' interpretation of the constitu-
tional right to counsel, coupled with the Supreme Court's silence 00
on the issue, lends added interest to the only federal court decision
on a DUI suspect's right to counsel. In Heles v. State of South
Dakota,01 the United States District Court for South Dakota held
that a person arrested for DUI has a right to consult an attorney
because:
To demand that a licensed driver be subjected to a choice involv-
ing important interests, and possibly an intrusion into his or her
body, to establish evidence of guilt, without first allowing the per-
son to contact an attorney, would be inconsistent with the due
process demands of both the Sixth and Fourteenth
95. Id. at 717, 481 A.2d at 199-200.
96. State v. Newton, 291 Or. 788, 805, 636 P.2d 393, 405 (1981).
97. Id. at 806, 636 P.2d at 405 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961)
(Harlan, J., dissenting from dismissal of appeal)).
98. 291 Or. at 808, 636 P.2d at 406.
99. Moore, 293 Or. at 723, 652 P.2d at 799.
100. But see supra note 6.
101. 530 F. Supp. 646 (D.S.D.), vacated as moot, 682 F.2d 201 (8th Cir. 1982).
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Amendments.""2
The federal court reached this decision despite clear and unwaver-
ing rejection of any such right by South Dakota's state courts,103
thus signalling that federal courts may take a more liberal view of
constitutional guarantees than do state courts.
The Heles decision was the primary basis for the trial court's
ruling in Armfield,1" but the Montana Supreme Court did not in-
dicate why it disregarded this authority. It is quite possible that
the Montana Supreme Court did not find Heles persuasive, as it
was vacated as moot by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals be-
cause the defendant had died by the time the case reached that
court.10
5
IV. STATE LAW OF No AVAIL TO ARMFIELD
The Armfield court did not offer any separate analysis of the
defendant's rights under the Montana Constitution, thus implying
that his rights are no more strongly protected by state than by
federal law.10 The doctrine of "independent and adequate" state
grounds is viewed by commentators as an opportunity to tap our
state's own legal heritage to provide greater protection of individ-
ual liberties than the federal constitutional minimum.10 7 The
court's failure to consider whether Montana's constitutional provi-
sion for a right to counsel0 8 might be broader or attach earlier
than the federal right is somewhat disappointing, but even if it had
performed the analysis the result presumably would have been the
same since the court chose the narrower interpretation from among
competing views of the federal constitutional right. Only if it had
wished to offer greater than traditional respect to the rights of the
accused would it have needed to ground its decision in an interpre-
tation of state law.10 9
102. Id. at 652.
103. See, e.g., Blow v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 83 S.D. 628, 164 N.W.2d 351
(1969); Peterson v. State, 261 N.W.2d 405 (S.D. 1977).
104. Respondent's Brief at 4.
105. 682 F.2d 201.
106. __ Mont. at -, 693 P.2d at 1228, 1229.
107. Elison & NettikSimmons, supra note 11, at 213-14.
108. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 24 provides in part that "In all criminal prosecutions the
accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel .... "
109. As the Washington Supreme Court did in Fitzsimmons, 94 Wash. 2d 858, 620
P.2d 999, after the remand by the Supreme Court, 449 U.S. 977.
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V. CONCLUSION
Removing drunk drivers from the highways is a matter of
compelling concern, but it must not be accomplished through the
sacrifice of fundamental constitutional rights. Those courts which
have maintained a steady and objective grasp of fairness in the
treatment of drunk drivers recognize that the drunk driver's rights
are no less important than those of a suspected murderer or rapist.
Preserving a right of reasonable access to counsel would not impair
the prosecution of DUI cases since a telephone call can be made in
the time it takes to ready the breathalizer machine for the test.110
Even if there were some loss of efficiency in DUI prosecutions, we
should be willing to accept that possibility if justice demands it. As
one judge has said:
Enforcement of all criminal laws would be made easier by use of
totalitarian-type of inquiry such as compulsory injection of truth
serum, lie-detectors and the similar devices of that nature. The
conception of justice in this nation has never included such prac-
tices as being acceptable even though some practical benefits
might accrue. 1'
110. See, e.g., Forte v. State, 683 S.W.2d 145, 158 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
111. Narten v. Curry, 33 Ohio Misc. 94, 96, 291 N.E.2d 799, 800 (1972).
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